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The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the Clash of Capitalisms 
and the Hamstrung Harmonisation of European (and French) Corporate 
Governance
1
  
 
Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the EU Takeover Directive and its transposition into French 
law.  French outcomes diverge from EC aspirations for greater clarity and uniformity. 
The clash of European capitalisms, and heightened uncertainty and differentiation in 
take regulation exacerbate problems of asymmetric vulnerability of EU states (and 
firms) to the EC liberal reform agenda. This explains the failings of EU-level 
harmonisation of varieties of capitalism and corporate governance. 
 
Word Count: 8, 029  
Introduction 
 
Originally proposed in 1989, the European Commission (EC) has long aspired to a 
liberal harmonization of European takeover regulation (and a common EU takeover 
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code), seeing it as crucial to the achievement of integrated European capital market by 
2010. In the 2004 version of the Takeover Directive, the EC harmonization agenda 
took a new turn, seeking to create a ‘level playing field’ across the EU. However, just 
as there are diverse national varieties of capitalism within the EU, so there are 
varieties of takeover markets (Jackson & Miyajima 2007), underpinned by different 
institutions, corporate governance norms, and ownership patterns.  
 
The market for corporate control (and regulation surrounding it) is potentially a highly 
significant mechanism of change within corporate governance (and capitalism) (see 
e.g. Clift 2007). This is why EC attempts at takeover harmonisation (along liberal, 
UK-influenced ‘Anglo-Saxon’ shareholder value lines) has provoked what Callaghan 
and Hoepner call a ‘clash of capitalisms’ (2005), crystallising into ‘contending 
conceptions of the internal market’, and ‘contending conceptions of capitalism in 
Europe’. The resultant ideological struggle pits ‘the neoliberal project’ against 
‘regulated capitalism’ and Europe as an ‘organized [economic] space’ (Hooghe & 
Marks 1999 : 74-9, 82-91; Wincott 2003: 292-4). Normative contestation surrounds 
the relative importance of these elements, and explains the failings and limitations of 
the Takeover Directive detailed below. 
 
Differing national ‘supply side’ takeover market conditions are deeply entrenched, 
institutionally embedded in national legal cultures and frameworks, and long 
established firm practices. This makes the ‘level playing field’ a forbiddingly difficult 
public policy goal. The patchwork quilt of different corporate governance and 
takeover market institutions and norms generates an ‘asymmetric vulnerability’ 
(Knudsen 2005: 524) of firms, and national corporate governance regimes, to attempts 
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at shareholder value-oriented EU-level regulatory change. This generates political 
tension, fuelling the ‘clash of capitalisms’. 
 
This article focuses on the European Takeover Directive, its long gestation process, 
and the impact of its transposition into national (specifically French) law, assessing 
the impact of EU level initiatives relative to the ambitions of reformers. After the 
failed 2001 attempt, the EU Takeover Directive was finally agreed in April 2004. 
However, during its legislative passage, it encountered impediments arising from the 
asymmetric vulnerability of different European varieties of capitalism, and 
specifically of different member states and firms, to its provisions. As a result, its key 
elements were made optional, meaning the new regime lacked ‘teeth’.  
 
The French model is employed here as a test case in assessing the relative import of 
the EU regional level, and more specifically the EC, as an actor inducing 
harmonisation within varieties of capitalism and corporate governance. The French 
case was selected because its takeover regime was, perhaps surprisingly, already 
aligned with a UK City Code, and its open, liberal regulatory framework. This 
‘goodness of fit’ with the EC model (the Takeover Directive being inspired by the 
City Code approach) augured well for harmonisation (see Featherstone 2003: 15-17; 
Radaelli 2003: 44-46; Borzel & Risse 2003: 59-61). However, in the Takeover 
Directive case, whilst the EC did have a significant impact on European takeover 
regimes, it did not induce the desired liberal harmonisation.  Rather, paradoxically, 
French transposition involved departures from pre-existing liberal norms.  
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Recent comparative capitalisms work has emphasised the heterogeneity within 
national models of capitalism (Deeg & Jackson 2007 155-6; Crouch 2005). Deeg and 
Jackson note the ‘differential adoption of ‘old’ and ‘new’ business practices according 
to sectoral and firm-specific characteristics’ (2007: 155). The hard law optionality of 
the Takeover Directive, now enshrined in national law, allows member states (or 
firms) to ‘opt in’ to new practices, creating the potential for increased differentiation 
between firms within ‘national capitalisms’. In relation to takeover regulation and 
corporate governance, the optionality renders more significant the mediation of 
capital market integration through national and firm-level corporate governance 
structures, institutions and norms. This generates increased diversity of outcomes, 
which can only exacerbate the asymmetric vulnerability of member states (and their 
firms) which have hitherto hamstrung the harmonisation of EU corporate governance.  
 
EU Takeover Regulation, Corporate Governance, and the Clash of European 
Capitalisms  
 
Varieties of Capitalism identifies two prevailing ideal-types of capitalism, the liberal 
(LME) and the co-ordinated market economy (CME) (Hall & Soskice 2001: 1-70). 
Corporate governance is a crucial element within any variety of capitalism, a ‘nexus 
of institutions’ (Cioffi 2000: 574) through which governments, state and firm actors 
organise and regulate corporate and economic activity. Its impact on actors’ 
behaviour, norms and incentive structures shapes how capitalism works in any given 
setting. The role of financial markets, and their relation to corporate governance, is 
significantly different within Hall and Soskice’s two ideal types. These map onto the 
comparative political economy distinction between ‘shareholder’ and ‘stakeholder’ 
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capitalism (Kelly, Kelly & Gamble 1997). CME and LME varieties of capitalism thus 
‘provide a broader institutional context within which stakeholder and shareholder 
models of governance can be analyzed’ (Vitols 2001: 338). 
 
Within the LME ideal-type, Hall and Soskice emphasise ‘competitive market 
arrangements’ to co-ordinate firm activities, and more specifically ‘highly competitive 
markets’ to ‘organise relations’ with firms’ ‘suppliers of finance’ (Hall & Soskice 
2001: 8-9). This is market-based firm financing, reliant on capital markets rather than 
bank- or institutionally-based processes. In CMEs, by contrast, ‘non-market’ 
interactions, institutions, relationships and ‘modes of co-ordination’ are crucial. Firms 
rely on these non-market oriented networks to ‘co-ordinate their endeavours’. Long-
termist relations with banks and other private, public or para-public financing 
institutions are characteristic CME modes of firm financing. These lead to ‘network 
monitoring based on the exchange of private information inside networks’ (Hall & 
Soskice 2001: 8). The cross-shareholdings which formerly sustained the ‘protected 
capitalism’ logic (Schmidt 1996) of France’s ‘financial network economy’ (Morin 
2000) are typical CME mechanisms. 
 
These two different approaches to the firm financing/corporate governance nexus 
have different implications for the likelihood, prevalence, and impact of corporate 
takeovers. This is why the apparently technical issue of takeover regulation is of great 
political economic significance because, at root, different approaches to takeovers 
reflect different models of political economy. Takeover regulation is a battleground in 
the clash of capitalisms within European corporate governance. Broadly speaking, to 
the extent that market mechanisms can operate un-impeded, the LME approach 
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prevails. To the extent that states and firms are able to introduce or rely on 
impediments to a free market for corporate control, a more co-ordinated, regulated, or 
‘institutional economy’ (Crouch & Streeck 1997) approach prevails.  
 
The potential for takeover, in particular hostile takeover, brings market discipline to 
bear on the behaviour and operations of management (Manne 1965). Below par 
performance can be punished in the capital markets by takeover bids, rewarding 
shareholders with higher share prices, and sanctioning poor management (often the 
first to go in subsequent restructuring).  Thus a freer functioning market for corporate 
control in theory results in increased emphasis on ‘shareholder value’, the core 
organising principle of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ LME capitalism (Sternberg 1998: 34-5). In the 
UK case, the liberal City Code means the threat of hostile takeover has an important 
impact on firm and executive behaviour. 
 
Thus much hinges on the presence (or not) of impediments to the free play of 
takeover market forces.  There are two broad (not necessarily mutually exclusive) 
categories of impediments to takeovers, ‘pre-bid’ and ‘post-bid’. One set of pre-bid 
takeover defences are clauses in the internal constitutions of companies which 
insulate management. These include differential shareholder voting rights such as 
‘golden shares’, multiple votes, voting ceilings, and limitations on certain investors’ 
voting rights. Perhaps the most notorious takeover defence is the ‘poison pill’, which 
involves ‘rights or warrants issued to shareholders that are worthless unless triggered 
by a hostile acquisition attempt. If triggered, pills give shareholders the ability to 
purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company’ (Monks & Minow 
2004: 236). This raises (perhaps exorbitantly) the cost of a bid, and can derail hostile 
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takeovers. These mechanisms empower ‘insiders’ at the expense of ‘outsiders’, and 
insulate incumbent management. It is to counter such insider protection that the 
liberal principle of ‘one share, one vote, one dividend’ is espoused within Anglo-
Saxon influenced calls for ‘good’ corporate governance (OECD 1999; 2004) as a 
battering ram to allow takeover market forces to penetrate these protective defences. 
More generally, patterns of concentrated (as opposed to dispersed) ownership hinder 
takeovers, so share buy-backs can operate as anti-takeover devices as firms seek to 
put more of their shares in their own hands. 
 
Post-bid takeover defences involve measures that target boards can take to derail a bid 
once launched. The range of ‘frustrating actions’ include divestitures (selling off or 
‘locking up’ prized assets to make the target less attractive), share buy-backs, the 
search for friendly ‘white knights’ to buy up significant stakes, and the issuing new 
shares (with unequal voting rights) to friendly shareholders. The liberal principle of 
‘board passivity’ seeks to outlaw such attempts to undermine the free market for bids. 
In similar vein, ‘mandatory bid’ rules clarify takeover processes by requiring a bid for 
the whole company to be launched once a controlling right is acquired. This prevents 
‘creeping control’ and protects minority shareholders. These different approaches to 
takeover regulation rest upon shareholder (LME) and stakeholder (CME) models of 
capitalism. 
 
Thus the ‘clash of capitalisms’ explains the political economic causes of divergences 
between the EC and some member states over specific takeover regulation proposals. 
Facilitating hostile takeovers at the EU-level, if successful, would augur 
transformation of the nexus of European corporate governance institutions, towards 
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LME shareholder value norms. Hoepner and Schafer have recently argued that 
European integration has entered a new phase in which it ‘systematically clashes with 
national varieties of capitalism’ but also ‘asymmetrically targets’ the institutions of 
CME stakeholder capitalism, with the result that ‘political resistance in the organised 
economies leads to a crisis of political integration’ (2007: 6). The findings here offer 
some support to Hoepner and Schafer’s thesis. The politics of EU takeover reform 
involved a ‘clash of capitalisms’ logic (Callaghan and Hoepner 2005) of defence of 
particular national approaches to corporate governance and takeovers from the 
perceived threat of LME-oriented re-regulation on the part of state actors in more 
CME-oriented economies (for example, France, Germany & Sweden). This illustrates 
how European initiatives present opportunities to policy actors in their import and 
mediation by institutions, governments, and national politics. 
 
However, whilst we agree with Hoepner and Schafer that the ‘clash of capitalisms’ is 
refracted through the institutions of EU economic governance, we would question the 
degree of efficacy, coherence, and internal consistency of ‘European integration’ of 
corporate governance posited in their account. It is erroneous to talk of a ‘European’ 
corporate governance reform agenda, either in relation to takeovers, or more broadly. 
A wide range of views, rooted in different models of political economy, generate 
ongoing normative conflict about appropriate corporate governance reform.  As 
Wincott points out, much Europeanisation literature is ‘too ready to identify the EU  - 
ontological – level as ordered, coherent, and consistent, providing a clear basis from 
which to develop claims about “Europeanisation”’ (2003: 300). Any assumption of 
coherence and shared understandings underpinning ‘the EU level’ in relation to 
takeover reform is misplaced.  
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The EC is one key player, but policy elites from many member states also play 
important roles. Amongst this multiplicity of actors, there is no accepted, agreed 
‘European’ approach to corporate governance reform. Rather, diverse elements 
endure within the process of European integration, generating ongoing political 
struggles between, at root, contending models of political economy. Thus the 
corporate governance regime within the European Union is ‘always still in formation, 
built through political contests and struggles’ (Wincott 2003: 300). The differential 
outcome of this ‘clash of capitalisms’ (Callaghan and Hoepner 2005) in different 
areas of corporate governance is all part of the variable geometry of Europeanisation.  
 
The Sisyphean Task of European Corporate Governance Harmonisation  
 
The scale of EC corporate law interventionism is impressive, with nearly 50 directives 
or regulations since 1968. Its impact is much more debatable, with the desired 
harmonisation of European corporate governance proving elusive. Much EC 
legislative effort has struggled to make its relevance felt within national corporate 
governance regimes. As Lannoo and Khachaturyan argue, ‘the more [the EC] tried to 
harmonise ‘corporate governance’’, ‘the less successful they were’ (2003: 5). The 
‘triviality thesis’ highlights ‘under-enforcement’, ‘sporadic enforcement’, ‘sporadic’ 
judicial interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and ‘parochial 
interpretation’, such that ‘one can doubt whether anything really worth calling EC 
corporate law exists “off the books”’, not least because ‘the Commission has 
traditionally lacked the resources to monitor Member States’ compliance with 
corporate law directives’ (Enriques 2006: 12; Enriques and Gatti 2006: 5).  
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Enriques argues that ‘most EC rules can be categorized as optional, market-
mimicking, unimportant, or avoidable’ (2006: 1-2, 6-11). European company law 
‘tends to be implemented and construed differently in each Member State, according 
to local legal culture and consistently with prior corporate law provisions’ (Enriques 
2006: 1-2). These ‘nationalistic tendencies in the interpretation of EC corporate law’ 
mean that ‘the prevailing interpretation of any given directive in each jurisdiction is, 
wherever possible, an interpretation compatible with the existing legal culture’ 
(Enriques 2006: 17-9). Halbhuber concurs, identifying how national ideational and 
institutional structures ‘filter European legal materials’, rendering it unlikely that EC 
corporate law ‘means the same for lawyers in different Member States’ (2001: 1385). 
 
There are some qualifications to the thesis (Enriques 2006: 44-45), notably the 
‘sporadic’ ECJ activism has given some rules meaningful impact, such as ECJ rulings 
on Centros and freedom of establishment with implications for a European ‘Delaware 
Effect’ and increased regulatory arbitrage (see Hoepner & Schafer 2007). The ECJ 
ruling against France over its ‘Golden shares’ in Elf-Acquitaine is another case in 
point (European Court of Justice 2002).  Overall, however, there is substantial 
empirical support for the Triviality thesis. Enriques identifies ‘major instances of 
implementing rules that are clearly at odds with the text of the directives’ which ‘can 
be found throughout the EU’ (2006: 13).  
 
Discerning the degree to which corporate governance reform is ‘European’ in origin is 
a useful analytical exercise, but it has to contend with a co-existence of national and 
European processes of company law and takeover reform. The waters are further 
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muddied by ‘hindsight bias’, where EC corporate law regulation merely restates 
already existing regulation at national level (Cheffins 1997; Enriques 2006: 20-23). In 
France, for example, much of the ground covered by the Takeover Directive was 
already subjected to comparable national level regulation. Of course, the ‘European’ 
reform agenda is informed by national policy elites rooted in the experience of the 
corporate governance practitioners. The influential ‘high level corporate governance 
working group’ (of 2001-2) and the subsequent European Corporate Governance 
Forum were sites of two-directional travel of ideas.  
 
Indeed, whilst a potentially useful analytical distinction, the compartmentalisation of 
‘national’ and ‘EU’ level does not here make sense in practice. Comparative 
capitalism and corporate governance scholars have noted how national corporate 
governance regimes are today ‘institutionally incomplete’ because ‘national 
institutions are becoming overlain by a growing set of European and international 
institutions’ (Deeg & Jackson 2007: 155). Thus a multi-levelled governance of 
corporate activity prevails, which spans the regional level (such as EU takeover 
regulation) and the global level (such as the World Trade Organisation), as well as the 
national. With increased cross-border flows, activities and actors, European corporate 
governance only makes sense if understood as a patchwork of national regimes. 
Relations between these national regimes are crucial to the 2004 EU-level attempt at 
takeover regulation harmonisation, since the EC model of a ‘level playing field’ for 
transnational corporate activity (in this case takeover deals) rests on an elusive  
concept of ‘reciprocity’ (see below), which only makes sense at the inter-national 
level. 
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In this instance, these analytical problems do not present insurmountable obstacles.  
The EC (notably the internal market directorate general) has a well established 
takeover regulation agenda, as laid out in its draft proposals for 2001 and 2004 
Takeover Directives. This ‘European’ takeover agenda, modelled on the UK City 
Code, is rooted in ‘one share, one vote’ and, more broadly, shareholder value 
corporate governance norms. The analysis below thus assesses the degree to which 
these LME shareholder value-oriented preferences prevail in the attempted 
harmonisation of European takeover regulation. 
 
EC Corporate Governance Harmonisation and the Market for Corporate 
Control 
 
EC enthusiasm for liberalising takeover regulatory reform dovetails with 
commitments to establish a fully integrated European capital market. The EC’s 
desired harmonization of European takeover regulation seeks to ensure an unimpeded 
market or corporate control in Europe, based on an assumption (for which there is at 
best equivocal support, see e.g. Clarke 2006: 361; Jackson & Miyajima 2007: 19-21) 
that takeovers enhance efficiency. The EC thus takes an explicit LME position within 
the European clash of capitalisms, aligned with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ OECD good 
corporate governance agenda (EC 2003: 12-14). In 2007, the Commission accentuated 
the positive aspects of takeovers as ‘efficient drivers of value creation’ which 
‘facilitate corporate restructuring’. The recognition that takeovers ‘are not always 
beneficial for all (or any) of the parties involved’ was relegated to a footnote (2007: 
3). Assuming that takeovers deliver efficient restructuring, the EC’s liberal aim has 
been to dismantle the defences described above that insiders use to derail takeovers.  
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The 2001 draft directive was viewed in some quarters as embodying an excessively 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ view of takeovers as a necessary discipline against inefficient 
management which ignored valued ‘stakeholder’ and CME-oriented European 
corporate governance traditions. Thus, conflicting models of capitalism (LME versus 
CME) were the root cause of the Takeover Directives’ troubled passage. Pre-bid 
defences, such as multiple and double voting shares, and concentrated ownership 
were recurrent sources of disagreement between EC and member states, as well as 
between member states themselves. The reason was the different conception of the 
firm financing/corporate governance nexus which these mechanisms and institutions 
embodied. For the same reason, the liberal principle of board passivity, and UK City 
Code-style limitations the directive sought to place on defensive measures by target 
boards subject to hostile takeover attempts (Article 9), generated resistance. 
Outlawing these (or allowing them only with shareholder approval) went against the 
grain of the ‘protected capitalism’ logic of some European CMEs. There were also 
concerns about insufficient protection of workers in target firms.  
 
Furthermore, Germany felt particularly vulnerable having engaged in reforms 
facilitating the development of a market for corporate control (abolishing multiple 
voting shares) in the 1998 KontraG Law (see Cioffi 2002). Given that the directive 
did not force all others to follow suit in abolishing multiple voting shares, and also did 
not other defences such as Golden Shares, Germany felt that the 2001 Takeover 
Directive failed to deliver a level playing field (Knudsen 2005: 510-11). With Ford 
eyeing up VW at the time, the German Government sought to prevent more hostile 
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takeovers of its national champions, as had happened with Vodaphone-Mannesmann 
in 1999. 
 
The first attempt at the Takeover Directive was rejected (just!) by the European 
Parliament on July 4 2001 in a dead-heat vote 273-273. The ‘clash of capitalisms’ was 
the underlying cause of rejection (Callaghan and Hopner 2005: 313-5). The 
stakeholder preferences of many member states and European firms were directly 
threatened by the EC’s shareholder value approach. The EC’s not too subtle (and 
failed) attempts at ‘divide and conquer’, seeking to isolate Germany did not help. This 
episode demonstrated the formidable obstacles to coercive harmonisation towards a 
single European Corporate governance framework. It was the Commission’s last 
heroic effort to ‘hard wire’ a harmonised European corporate governance regime. Its 
failure is of course wholly consistent with the triviality thesis. In the face of the 
demonstrable inefficacy of the EC as a coercive harmonisation inducing corporate 
governance actor through ‘hard’ law, the strategy shifted to a soft law approach. The 
2003 Corporate Governance Action Plan begins by recognising the need for national 
actors to ‘reconcile’ the reform process to their ‘domestic circumstances’ (EC 2003: 
1). The Commission consistently recognised the need to be ‘flexible in application’ of 
the programme (EC 2003: 4).  
 
The Commission convened a ‘high level’ working group of corporate governance and 
European company law experts, headed by Jaap Winter, to chart progress towards 
‘good’ corporate governance within the EU. More specifically, they were charged 
with developing measures to achieve the new priority of the ‘level playing field’ (one 
of the issues which torpedoed the 2001 Directive), and drafting new Takeover 
 15 
Directive proposals. The Winter group’s report assumed takeovers to be efficiency 
enhancing, and emphasised shareholder decision making, and their new concept of 
proportionality between risk-bearing capital and control. The working group’s 
recommendations adhered to ‘one share, one vote’ norms as an integral element of 
good corporate governance, and recommended abolishing multiple voting rights 
(Knudsen 2005: 519). The group thus took an ideological position on one side of the 
‘clash of capitalisms’ divide described above. The LME shareholder value-oriented 
approach was later characterised by Bolkestein as promoting ‘best corporate 
governance practice’ (Bolkestein 2004: 3).  
 
The new recommendations were, in fact, more radical than the earlier defeated 
measures, arguing strongly for their particular conception of a ‘level playing field’. 
The idea was to ensure equivalent safeguards for shareholders in all European public 
listed companies. Furthermore, arbitrary differences in governance structures across 
the EU should not distort the corporate restructuring process (Clarke 2006: 355-6). 
Yet the proposed solution did not remove the problem of asymmetric vulnerability of 
particular firms or member states. Rather, some argued, the new proposals ‘would hit 
dominant shareholders and incumbent managers around the EU unevenly, prohibiting 
some structural defences while leaving others untouched’ (Enriques 2006: 63).  
 
The Group’s recommendations fed into another proposal presented by the 
Commission in October 2002. This new Directive’s guiding principals were that 
shareholders get equal treatment, are given sufficient information and time to reach an 
informed decision, and that the target board acts in the interests of the company. The 
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dissemination of information to employees of the target firm was also required. 
Mandatory bid provisions were included, with thresholds defined at the national level.  
 
The new proposals still contained the controversially LME-oriented Article 9 ensuring 
board passivity (preventing post-bid frustrating actions). Seeking to overcome pre-bid 
defensive institutional engineering designed to impede hostile takeover, the revised 
proposal in autumn 2003 included a new ‘Breakthrough’ rule (Article 11). Designed 
by the Winter group, this established a threshold of 75% of the target’s shares; ‘once a 
bidder successfully reaches a threshold of shares in accordance with national 
company law, the new majority can annul the structural defensive devices’ (Knudsen 
2005: 519; Menucq 2006: 229).  
 
The ‘Breakthrough’ rule would have the liberalising effect of neutralising pre-bid 
defences including multiple voting rights, voting ceilings, and restrictions on transfers 
of securities. The aim was to create a successful takeover market in Europe despite 
differential capital and control structures across European countries and firms. The 
rule applies ‘one share, one vote’ even to multiple voting shares in the shareholder 
annual general meeting (AGM) or extraordinary general meeting (EGM) which 
decides on defensive measures (as per Article 9), and the first post-successful bid 
shareholder meeting deciding the new structures and constitution of the company 
(Clarke 2006: 367). ‘Breakthrough’ was the battering ram the shareholder value 
enthusiasts used to breach the defences of European CMEs with concentrated 
ownership and ‘stakeholder capitalism’ norms. 
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Hostility to the ‘Breakthrough’ rule was particularly intense in parts of Scandinavia, 
especially Sweden.  There, the A & B dual stock tradition (with A stock carrying 
many times more voting rights than B stock) was seen by Swedish MEPs as integral 
to the Swedish model of capitalism (Knudsen 2005: 519). Furthermore, the Swedes 
pointed out, the new proposals were not likely to improve progress towards a level 
playing field because the proposals exempted France’s double share tradition (since 
these were not a separate class of share). The new proposed Directive proved 
unacceptable to Member States, and agreement could not be reached in the European 
Council meeting on 19 May 2003. The ‘one share, one vote’ principle was a major 
stumbling block (Ipekel 2005: 342-3) because it went to the heart of the differing 
LME and CME conceptions of corporate governance.  
 
The global level playing field issue remained contentious, with French and German 
negotiators pointing out that US boards retained a range of defensive measures 
including ‘poison pills’ (Monks & Minow 2004: 236). The proposed Takeover 
Directive, in depriving European firms of defence mechanisms, would not only 
undermine the coherence of co-ordinated capitalism, but also skew the playing field 
against European firms. Again Germany argued that because one share one vote and a 
lack of takeover defences was not the norm everywhere, the ‘playing field’ would be 
unfair. As Clarke notes, ‘the ghost of the hard-fought hostile takeover of Mannesmann 
in Germany may have haunted the negotiating table’ (2006: 374; Knudsen 2005: 510-
2).  
 
Following a revised Commission proposal in Autumn 2003, the European Parliament 
finally adopted a watered down Takeover Directive 321-219 on December 16 2003. 
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Crucially, it makes the key articles 9 (board passivity) and 11 (‘Breakthrough’) 
optional for Member States. Furthermore it introduced the notion of reciprocity 
regarding board passivity and ‘Breakthrough’. ‘Reciprocity’ is the clumsy concept (of 
questionable practicability) designed to address the level playing field issue. This new 
concept in EU company law, set out in Article 12(3), specifies that ‘Member States 
may, under the conditions determined by national law, exempt companies [from 
applying board passivity and/or the Breakthrough rule] … if they become the subject 
of an offer launched by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do, 
or by a company controlled, directly or indirectly, by the latter’ (EC 2004). It falls to 
national securities regulators to adjudicate the equivalence of measures, and very little 
guidance is offered, generating a lack of clarity about how reciprocity will be 
interpreted by member states.
2
  
 
The Winter report assumed that both Articles 9 and 11 would be required in tandem to 
create a level playing field, and either on its own would not deliver that objective. The 
optional nature of these elements in the final Directive means that the ‘level playing 
field’ remains unattained. Reciprocity potentially addresses the lack of a level playing 
field between European and American firms. However, the Directive is unclear 
whether reciprocity applies in relation to non-EU bidders (Menucq 2006: 233; Clarke 
2006: 373). The Directive generates uncertainty for bidders as to which restrictions 
apply in particular cases by enabling individual firms to opt back in to board passivity 
and breakthrough, even if ‘their’ member state opts out. Firms may thus ‘opt in’ to a 
                                                 
2
 In interviews in May 2007, French securities regulators indicated their ongoing 
uncertainty as to the operationalisation and practicability of reciprocity. 
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more liberal regime voluntarily, for example to facilitate takeovers where they are 
bidders.  
 
The new Takeover Directive came into force in April 2004, with transposition into 
national law required within two years.  The optionality and à la carte nature of the 
Directive stripped it of its desired harmonizing effect. It fell far short of the Winter 
group’s ambitions for convergence on the LME model, facilitating as it did the 
enduring diversity of European capitalism in relation to corporate governance and 
takeovers. EC Commissioner Fritz Bolkestein recorded his hostility, regarding the 
directive as a testament to national protectionism which he deemed not worth the 
paper it was written on (Callaghan & Hoepner 2005: 311). 
 
Harmonizing European Takeover Regulation? The Impact of the Takeover 
Directive in the French case. 
 
Despite being an example of co-ordinated or statist capitalism (Schmidt 2003) with 
long-established dirigiste norms of state intervention (Shonfield 1965; Hayward 
1973), the pre-existing French takeover regime was remarkably liberal. Crouch has 
rightly pointed to ‘the diversity of economic institutions’ within capitalism, with 
empirical cases including forms drawn from different capitalist types (2005: 440). 
This aspect of the French case illustrates the point well. Since the late 1980s, the 
principles guiding the legal regulation of takeovers have been aligned closely with 
UK norms – including board passivity (unlike in many European countries). 
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The reason for this is the neo-liberal turn in French politics in the 1980s (Jobert & 
Théret 1994). The 1980s saw extensive liberalisation of the French model of 
capitalism, the state-orchestrated liberalising re-regulation of the French financial 
system, and a revitalisation of French stock markets (Cerny 1989; Clift 2004). The 
creation of a Second Marché of unlisted securities, and the development of a 
commercial paper market allowed companies to raise capital directly from public 
through private bond issues. Takeover regulation underwent similar liberalisation. 
From 1987 onwards, bids no longer required ministerial authorisation. French banks 
and large enterprises’ desire for clearer takeover regulation culminated in the 1989 
law.  
 
The 1989 law includes a mandatory bid rule (a requirement to bid for 100% of the 
company), with a trigger threshold of 33% of capital (Journal Officiel 1989). The 
legislation outlaws ‘secret understandings’ and ‘covert changes of control’ 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2006: 16-18). French law thus already prohibited many 
measures which ‘locked up’ the capital of firms in the case of a takeover bid, and 
ensured equitable treatment of all offers. The principles of sufficient information and 
opportunity for shareholders to decide upon the merits of an offer were written into 
both the Autorité des Marché Financiers (AMF), and before that Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse (COB) regulations, and French financial law. This suggests a 
(perhaps unexpectedly) conducive environment to corporate governance 
harmonization along the UK City Code lines desired by the EC. 
 
However, this new liberal environment was reconciled to French ‘protected 
capitalism’ norms through a range of enduring impediments to takeovers, which 
 21 
greatly reduced its significance and impact (see below). Paradoxically, the 
privatisation process expanded these. Finance minister Balladur’s hand-picking of the 
benefactors of privatisation between 1986 and 1988 deliberately reinforced the 
noyaux durs (hard cores of investors) within France’s ‘financial network economy’ 
(Schmidt 1996: 369-392). Thus, despite the liberalised takeover regime, the French 
state retained the orchestrating mechanisms to protect French firms through cross-
shareholding, and interlocking board directorships. 
 
Whilst the overall legal regime is broadly conducive to takeover activity, a recurrent 
theme of re-regulatory activity in France has been the desire to carve out scope for 
dirigiste interventionism in ‘strategic’ sectors. In the 1980s and 1990s, ‘Golden 
shares’ in privatised firms were one means to this end, though these have become of 
marginal significance (EC 2005: 14, 22). Laws were passed in 1996 (Journal Officiel 
1996), 2003
 
(Journal Officiel 2003)  and December 2005 (Journal Officiel 2005) 
specifying that French state approval is required for takeover or investment in 
‘strategic sectors’ such as national defence, public health or public order.  
 
The revision to French monetary code required governmental authority for takeovers 
in 11 ‘sensitive’ sectors (see Menucq 2006: 230; EC 2006). The Breton Law of July 
2005 created an obstacle to the hostile takeover of Renault, in requiring a bidder for a 
target ‘parent company’ to also bid for overseas ‘subsidiaries’ (in which the target 
holds more than a one-third stake – this, in Renault’s case, includes Nissan). This kind 
of targeted protection remains a feature of French takeover regulation. Furthermore, 
the very substantial financial assets of the Caisse des dépôts et consignation (CDC) 
have often been deployed strategically by the state, investing in large French firms 
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deemed in the national interest. Although not as central in the wake of privatisation, 
the French state’s shareholder role in a number of large French firms is still a feature 
of French capitalism.  
 
In addition to legislative interventions, dirigiste French state actors and politicians (on 
both Left & Right) have recently re-engaged dramatically in public debates 
surrounding hostile takeovers. With a few specific exceptions, the French state lacks 
the policy mechanisms to back up its rhetorical hostility to takeover as the case of 
Arcelor demonstrated).
3
 Nevertheless, vociferous ‘economic patriotic’ critique can act 
as a dissuasive measure (as in the case of Pepsico & Danone in 2005).  
 
A variety of obstacles stand in the path of the free play of takeover market forces. 
Concentrated ownership remains widespread in French capitalism, in contrast to the 
dispersed ownership patterns in the UK and US (Barca & Becht 2001; O’Sullivan 
2003). The erosion of the noyaux durs since the mid 1990s is considerable but not 
complete (Loriaux 2003: 116; Morin 2000: 39). Their legacy remains in the capital 
structure of many firms. In 2002, networks of influence constructed around three big 
                                                 
3
 The successful hostile takeover of Arcelor is unusual in the French context, in that 
Mittal’s team went round winning over shareholders one by one, and the board 
remained opposed, almost until the bitter end. The success of this hostile takeover 
could, like the BNP Paribas case, be interpreted as a turning point in French 
capitalism. However, this is a time consuming and very costly approach. To succeed, 
it required someone with Mittal’s resources on the one hand, and a series of clumsy 
responses from the Arcelor CEO (notably approaching a Russian oligarch as a 
potential ‘white knight’) to effectively drive its shareholders into the Mittal camp. 
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banks – BNP, Société Générale and Crédit Lyonnais remained in place, and thirty 
directors enjoyed between them 160 seats on the boards of major French firms 
(Orange 2002). Of France’s 20 largest companies, 8 still have a controlling 
shareholder. Family ownership of large firms remains a common phenomenon within 
French capitalism (Philippon 2007: 14, 51-70), and another variant of concentrated 
ownership. 
 
Concentrated ownership operates through a range of the ‘pre-bid’ defensive measures 
described above, contained within company statutes. These bolster the position of the 
incumbent management or dominant shareholders, and make hostile takeover more 
difficult (Enriques & Volpin 2007: 117). Mechanisms include differential voting 
rights, clauses limiting the right to designate board members, shareholder agreements, 
voting ceilings and restrictions enable controlling shareholder exercising control 
without necessarily owning a large proportion of the cash flow rights. All of these 
protect ‘insiders’, and align with ‘stakeholder’ and CME approaches to the firm 
financing /corporate governance nexus.  
 
French double voting shares are another key element in protecting ‘insiders’.  The 
double voting right is a reward for loyalty, awarded to all without discrimination who 
have held shares for over two years. As well as double votes, and a range of voting 
ceilings limit the voting rights of certain investors, there is also a prevalence of 
shareholder pacts, notably those restricting transfer of securities. All these allow 
management to ‘create a friendly shareholder group’ with the effect of ‘seriously 
obstructing a change of control’ (Fanto 1998: 74). Both unequal voting rights and 
voting ceilings are much more prevalent in France than in any other major economy. 
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Furthermore, these practices are increasingly prevalent, incrementally replacing the 
noyaux durs as instruments to dissuade takeovers (Magnier 2002: 73-4; Goyer 
2003:197 & Table 6.5). In theory, the bottom line is that all of the dissuasive 
measures are public knowledge, and therefore get factored into the price offered by 
the bidder, or bidders. However, the collective impact of these mechanisms is to insert 
a good deal of ‘viscosity’ into the system.4  
 
Some impediments to takeovers in France relate not to strategic design by feather-
bedding management or dominant shareholders, but are a by-product of the historical 
development of French capitalism. France has lacked a culture which invested in 
financial savings instruments such pension funds or mutual funds. Companies have 
not traditionally looked to financial markets for investment. Thus, from the ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’ sides, financial markets as a source of capital for enterprises remained 
underdeveloped. The historic reliance on institutionally allocated credit (orchestrated 
through the state) rationed industrial investment. This led the French economy to be 
caricatured as ‘capitalism without capital’ (Stoffaes, 1989: 122).  It accounts for the 
comparative lack of medium-sized firms French corporations. This industrial profile 
had an impact on takeovers, reducing the number of targets for anyone but the richest 
bidders. This, combined with the reasons above, explains why there are relatively few 
hostile takeovers in France, despite a permissive legal environment. Jackson and 
Miyajima note that there have been only 18 hostile takeover attempts in France 
between 1991 and 2005. This compares 176 in the UK, and 332 in the USA in the 
same period (2007: 47 figure 21).  
 
                                                 
4
 The term was used in interview by a leading French investment banker, April 2007. 
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French Transposition of the Takeover Directive in March 2006 
 
Transposition took place in a charged political context, with talk of ‘economic 
patriotism’ in spate as it gushed from the mouths of Prime Minister De Villepin and 
Finance minister Thierry Breton. The (ultimately successful) hostile takeover by 
Mittal of Arcelor, begun two months earlier, had been greeted with thinly veiled 
hostility by the French government. This case was governed by Luxembourgish, not 
French, law and therefore would not be affected by the bill. Nevertheless, this 
economic patriotism raised the stakes of what might otherwise have been a technical 
debate. French policy-makers used transposition and opt-outs to protect valued 
elements of French capitalism (such as shareholder pacts).  Moreover, their dirigiste 
urges led them to expand their scope for interventionism in corporate takeovers. The 
poison pill, a key provision of the new law (see below), had not been present in earlier 
drafts of the bill. The departures from pre-existing liberal norms were a clear response 
to the perceived vulnerability of large French firms following the Mittal-Arcelor 
takeover bid. 
 
In not opting out of Article 9, France retained its established board passivity norms, 
restricting the frustrating action detailed above and encouraging the free market of 
bids during an offer period (Belze 2005). The March 2006 Law transposing the 
directive involved some significant changes to France’s regime, notably the 
requirement of prior shareholder approval during the bid period for takeover 
defences. Previously, prior shareholder delegation of powers to target boards 
(provided it met certain exigent conditions, including that the action would not make 
the bid fail) could be used in a bid period. Now, measures taken before the bid, which 
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might impact upon it (and do not come under ‘normal’ operations of the company) 
must also be approved. Although the law’s provisions governing shareholder 
meetings facilitates convening them at short notice, shareholder approval is an 
exacting requirement, and hastily-convened shareholder meetings are rare in France. 
This of course does not outlaw frustrating action if the shareholders endorse it.  
 
Furthermore, hitherto outlawed frustrating action becomes possible under certain 
conditions due to French endorsement of the reciprocity principle. Under reciprocity, 
board passivity does not apply if the bidder’s national laws do not contain similar 
board passivity provisions. The AMF has latitude to judge what constitutes the level 
playing field, given the conditions under which the bidder operates. It also determines 
the equivalence of provisions in foreign company law, and thus what is permissible 
for French firms targeted by overseas investors (Lamy 2006: 6). The EC’s clumsy 
attempt at ‘levelling’ the playing field thus opens up the possibility, in the French 
case, for a move away (given shareholder approval within the previous 18 months) 
from the EC’s favoured board passivity norms. The new law employed a broad 
interpretation of reciprocity, enabling companies to dispense with Article 9 if the 
bidder was not subject to it. Furthermore, if the bid is a case of concerted action, if 
one of the bidders does not apply the relevant article, boards are not constrained by 
passivity restrictions. The Directive text is unclear whether this was the intention 
(ASAP 2006: 6-7).  
 
Article 18 legislates part of the ‘Breakthrough rule’, instituting a one share one vote 
principle for any meeting called to authorise defensive measures, and the first AGM 
after a successful bid and provided the bidder holds 75% of the shares (Enriques 
 27 
2006: 24-6; Menucq 2006: 231). Statutory voting restrictions are also suspended for 
the first AGM after a successful bid. In France the COB (precursor to AMF) had long 
enforced a similar rule once a threshold of 66% of either capital or voting rights was 
reached (Marini 2005: 100-101). Thus, unlike in Germany and Sweden, this 
contentious part of the new EU regime presented no difficulties to French 
policymakers.  
 
The French legislator did exercise optionality in relation to other parts the Directive’s 
‘Breakthrough Rule’. The pre-existing AMF code suspended statutory restrictions on 
the transfer of securities during an offer period. This enters into French law in the 
transposition of the directive in Article 15 (Marini 2005: 101-2). However, parts 11 
(2) and (3) of Breakthrough challenged the central role of shareholder pacts and 
contracts between shareholders. These non-market mechanisms are seen as crucial 
cement in the networks that co-ordinate corporate activity within French capitalism. 
France permits such ‘flexible financing and control’ structures, but requires 
transparency surrounding them (Novelli 2005: 12-3). These kinds of ‘contractual 
agreements’ are often defended as enabling founders of medium sized companies to 
retrain control of the company when listing (Menucq 2006: 231). For this reason, to 
avoid liberal harmonisation and preserve the pre-existing role of shareholder pacts 
within its corporate governance, France has, as the Directive permits, opted out of 
parts of the ‘Breakthrough rule’. Crucially, the suspension of statutory restrictions on 
voting rights, the suspension of ‘contractual’ restrictions (shareholder pacts) in 
relation to both transfers of securities and on voting rights is left optional in Articles 
16, 17 and 19 of the new law.  
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One aim of the Breakthrough Rule was to tackle multiple voting rights, and different 
classes of share which are one of the major obstacles to hostile takeover in some 
contexts, such as the U.S.. This could potentially challenge another valued 
particularity of French corporate governance, the double voting right. However, 
because they are not a separate class of share, and they lose their double status on 
sale, the Directive does not affect them.  Their place within French corporate 
governance is defended by the government and many actors within the corporate 
governance milieu.
5
 This entrenched attachment to this departure from one share one 
vote explains why double votes were successfully defended in the context of both the 
drafting and the transposition of the Takeover Directive. This ensured the ongoing 
distinctiveness of the French model of capitalism in this important respect. 
 
There was, however, one area where the French government did draw inspiration 
from U.S. takeover regulation. At first glance this might appear grist to the mill of 
those asserting an Anglo-Saxon convergence within French capitalism. Yet, the 
American market for corporate control is nothing like the free and open play of bids 
disciplining management to prioritise shareholder value that the LME ideal-type 
describes. Rather, U.S. corporate governance law has a very well-developed anti-
takeover arsenal (Monks & Minow 2004: 42, 110-120, 232-239). In this case, the 
French government engaged in policy transfer of a US-style ‘poison pills’ or anti-
takeover devices in order to bolster their ‘economic patriotic’ capacity to protect 
French firms.  
 
                                                 
5
 Interivews with corporate governance advisors, lawyers, investment bankers and 
policy advisors, Paris, April-May 2007.  
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The new French legislation included the possibility for target boards, with shareholder 
approval, to issue new securities (in both the pre- and post- bid period) at discounted 
price to existing shareholders. These ‘bons de souscription’ (also known as ‘bons 
Breton’, named after the initiator of the law) are modelled on American ‘poison pills’. 
This is the first time anything of the sort has existed in French law. Under reciprocity, 
if the bidder does not apply article 9, these and other defensive measures can be 
issued or pursued by the board at its discretion provided that authorisation has been 
gained from a shareholder AGM within the previous 18 months. Their effect is to 
dilute the effect of any holdings the acquirer already has in the firm, and to raise 
(perhaps dramatically) the price of the bid. By making control considerably harder to 
achieve, and raising the price, the aim is not so much to warn off the bidder as to raise 
the price of the offer and to facilitate negotiation on terms more favourable to the 
target firm. Its likely effect, recognised by Breton, was to increase the price, rather 
than to make the bid fail outright (Marini 2006: 11-12).  
 
Finance Minister Breton’s overall assessment was that the Law ‘enabled French firms 
to have the same weapons,’ and prevented French firms from being penalised but 
introduced a clearer rule of law governing their overseas expansion (Agence France 
Press 2006: 1). In the shareholder AGM season immediately following the new law 
several companies, including Bouygues, Eurazeo, Saint-Gobain and Suez obtained 
shareholder approval to implement BSAs Breton. In total 19 large French firms voted 
these poison pills onto their statutes in 2006, and a further 15 were introduced in the 
2007 AGM season. Any firm subject to a bid could, of course, follow suit given 
shareholder approval. These poison pills, combined with the new reciprocity 
provisions, in practice expand options for management defensive measures. The likely 
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effect of reciprocity is to create a very variegated picture in terms of anti-takeover 
defence measures.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The clash of European capitalisms has been fought on the terrain of takeover 
regulation. As a result, far from delivering LME-oriented harmonisation (dismantling 
impediments to the market for corporate control), transposing the Takeover Directive 
in fact introduced new forms of protection (EC 2007: 6, 10-11). The battleground for 
European takeovers remained every bit as uneven a surface as it had been prior to the 
Directive. The EC’s ‘level playing field’ remains illusory. Furthermore, given the 
permitted national derogations, the crucial opt-outs (Articles 9 and 11), and the 
reciprocity rule, the terrain will become more undulating and nationally variegated 
(with heightened ambiguity and opacity). This finding necessitates a counter-intuitive 
rejoinder to the ‘triviality thesis’. The EC as a corporate governance actor has had a 
demonstrable impact, its initiative presenting opportunities to policy actors in their 
import and mediation by national law and politics. The EC has not, however, induced 
liberal harmonisation of European takeover regimes.  
 
Recent re-regulation within French corporate governance has not uniformly emulated 
shareholder value norms.  French policy elites, in transposing the Takeover Directive, 
used the opportunity to rebalance LME and CME elements within the diversity of 
French capitalist institutions to increase their interventionist scope to protect French 
firms. Paradoxically, the most significant shift away from freer takeover market was 
introduced as a direct result of transposing the LME-oriented EU Takeover Directive. 
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The French government institutionalised resistance to the liberal takeover model 
through the ‘economic patriotic’ policy transfer of U.S. poison pills, ironically 
expanding the range of anti-takeover defences available to target boards. This 
demonstrates how acceptance of some liberal ‘shareholder value’-oriented elements 
co-exists with enduring attachment among French policy elites (of left and right) to 
‘stakeholder capitalism’ institutions and norms and to co-ordinated, ‘statist’ French 
capitalism. Although the French context remains relatively open to takeover bids 
compared to many other European countries, the increased prevalence of voting 
ceilings and double votes, along with the introduction of poison pills, indicate the 
potential for more defensive institutional engineering.  New obstacles impede 
takeovers in France, and the French corporate governance and takeover context is 
more ambiguous and unpredictable in the wake of transposition.  
 
The clash of capitalisms, overlain with the ‘asymmetric vulnerability’ (Knudsen 2005: 
524) of firms, and national corporate governance regimes, to EU-level regulatory 
change, generates resistance to the EU liberalising takeover reform agenda at the 
national and firm level. This constitutes a major obstacle facing supra-national reform 
of corporate governance, given the ability of national level actors to reshape and 
amend takeover reforms, both during their passage through the European Parliament 
and in the transposition into domestic law (EC 2007: 10-11). Both countries and firms 
can opt in and out, increasing the heterogeneity within national varieties of capitalism. 
This increased differentiation creates a feedback effect which will increase problems 
of asymmetric vulnerability.  
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Future attempts at the EU-level reform corporate governance will continue to be 
hamstrung by this (increasing) variety and complexity of institutional and legal 
environments of corporate governance in Europe, as well as the multitude of 
defensive measures at European firms’ disposal. As the Takeover Directive 
demonstrated, EC exhortation to endorse supra-national corporate governance 
harmonisation is insufficient to overcome entrenched corporate and political 
opposition. This is in part because the assumed superiority of the EC model of 
political economy, rooted in LME institutions such as shareholder value, and one 
share one vote, is not accepted. Underlying this lack of consensus is an ongoing 
contestation surrounding European models of capitalism and their relative merits. 
This clash of capitalisms explains why the Takeover Directive was emasculated 
through optionality, and why the EC failed in its bid to develop an EU Takeover 
Directive with teeth.  
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